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RESTITUTION IN CONSUMER PROTECTION ACTIONS: 
STOP THE RELIANCE ON RELIANCE 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Maryland, it is fairly simple to cheat people out of their 
money and not have to return it, even if you get caught. The key is 
to cheat a very large group of people, but cheat each person out of 
very little money. That way, it is not worth it for any individual to 
bring a lawsuit against you. I The Consumer Protection Division 
(hereinafter "CPD" or "the Division") might bring a public action 
on behalf of the Feople you wronged; that is, after all, the function 
of the Division. The Division might issue an injunction so that 
you can not continue to cheat people. 3 The Division might even 
penalize you. 4 The Division should make you give up the money 
you made wrongfully, 5 but you probably do not have to worry 
about that. 
To make you give up the money, the Division first would have 
to come up with a plan to get that money back to the people you 
wronged. 6 Then, each person who wanted his or her money back 
(and remember, you were smart about that, so each person only 
lost a little money, but there were a lot of people) would have to 
ask for it. 7 So all of the money you made from people the Division 
cannot locate or people who do not want to bother reclaiming a 
few dollars, or a few cents, all of that money would be yours to 
keep. At least that is how it seems to go under Maryland's current 
laws. 
Using restitution, Maryland courts theoretically move ill-gotten 
benefits from a wrongdoer's possession back to the rightful 
owner's possession. 8 In reality, Maryland courts' restrictions on 
restitution in cases arising under the Consumer Protection Act 
(hereinafter "CPA" or "the Act") benefit offending businesses and 
organizations and unduly burden consumers, contrary to the intent 
of the Act. 9 Judicial interpretation and legislative reform could 
redirect restitution such that courts and the Consumer Protection 
Division could help consumers through restoration of their losses, 
as well as punish and deter offending businesses. 10 
1. See generally infra note 149 and accompanying text. 
2. See generally infra notes 15-20 and accompanying text. 
3. See generally infra note 16 and accompanying text. 
4. See generally infra note 18 and accompanying text. 
5. See generally infra notes 17-20 and accompanying text. 
6. See infra note 91 and accompanying text. 
7. See infra note 91 and accompanying text. 
8. See discussion infra Part II(B). 
9. See discussion infra Part III(A). 
10. See discussion infra Part III. 
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Part II(A) of this Comment will explain the CPA, how it 
protects consumers and regulates businesses, and the roles reliance 
and restitution play in the process. Part II(B) will differentiate 
between the disgorgement and return aspects of restitution. Part 
II(C) will describe court-imposed restrictions on restitution orders, 
and Part II(D) will provide case examples of such restrictions in 
Maryland. Part III(A) will address the outcomes and implications 
of these cases, and it will suggest how and why to limit the proof 
of reliance that the courts demand. Part III(B) will propose new 
legislation defining two categories of consumer protection actions, 
eliminating the reliance requirement in one category and 
introducing fluid recovery in the other category. Part IV will 
indicate how these proposals will allow for the CPD to operate 
more effectively and efficiently, serving consumers and deterring 
offending businesses. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. The Consumer Protection Act 
The Consumer Protection Act, as its name indicates, protects 
consumers from unfair or deceptive trade practices. 11 It also 
punishes businesses for engaging in such practices and deters 
businesses from similar conduct in the future. 12 The General 
Assembly enacted the CPA in response to an increase in deceptive 
consumer practices and a decrease in "public confidence in 
merchants offering goods, services, realty, and credit.,,13 To 
counteract these problems, the General Assembly promulgated in 
the CPA "improved enforcement procedures" that constituted 
"strong protective and preventive steps . . . to assist the public in 
obtaining relief from these [ unlawful consumer] practices, and to 
prevent these practices from occurring in Maryland." 14 The Act 
provides for the CPD to investigate businesses and organizations 
that might be engaging in "unfair and deceptive trade 
practice [ s ]," 15 issue "cease and desist order[ s]" to offending 
businesses,16 "[u]ndertake activities to encourage business and 
industry to maintain high standards of honesty," 17 and "[ e ]xercise 
and perform any other function, power, and dut~ appropriate to 
protect and promote the welfare of consumers." 1 The CPD has 
II. See MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 13-102(b)(3) (2005). 
12. Id. 
13. Id. § 13-102(a)(3), (b)(2). 
14. !d. § 13-102(b)(3). 
15. Id. § 13-204; see also § 13-30 I (defining unfair and deceptive trade practices). 
16. Id. § 13-204(4). 
17. Id. § 13-204(9). 
18. Id. § 13-204(11). 
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the authority to detennine an appropriate remedy.19 The Act 
provides for restitution pursuant to public hearing where the CPD 
fin'ds a violation of the Act20 and as a remedy in conciliation 
procedures. 21 
1. No Reliance for Proof of Violation 
To prove a violation of the Act-the Erecursor to a restitution 
order-the CPD need not prove reliance. 2 Reliance is defined as 
"[ d]ependence or trust by a person, esp[ ecially] when combined 
with action based on that dependence or truSt.,,23 A plaintiff 
typically must prove reliance when arguing a case in which the 
defendant obtained the plaintiffs money or property through some 
unfair or deceRtive practice. 24 However, Vnifonn Commercial 
Code (V.C.C.) 5 language suggests that reliance is no longer a 
requirement for restitution in some contractual situations. 26 
Consumer protection actions brought by the CPD also present a 
special circumstance. 27 
19. Consumer Prot. Div. v. Consumer Publ'g Co., 304 Md. 731, 747, 501 A.2d 48, 
56-57 (1985). 
20. MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 13-403(b)( I )(i) states the following: 
If, at the conclusion of the hearing, the Division determines on the 
preponderance of the evidence that the alleged violator violated this 
title, the Division shall state its findings and issue an order requiring 
the violator to cease and desist from the violation and to take 
affirmative action, including the restitution of money or property. 
See also id. § 13-406 (available remedies include restoration of money or 
property to wronged consumer). 
21. See id. § 13-402(b)(I)(ii). 
22. Id. § 13-302 ("Any practice prohibited by this title is a violation of this title, 
whether or not any consumer in fact has been misled, deceived, or damaged as a 
result of that practice."). This statute is consistent with other states' handling of 
restitution in consumer protection actions. See infra note 61 and accompanying 
text. 
23. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1316 (8th ed. 2004). 
24. See Luskin's, Inc. v. Consumer Prot. Div., 353 Md. 335, 386, 726 A.2d 702, 727 
(1999) (citing Consumer Publ'g, 304 Md. at 779, 501 A.2d at 73). 
25. The U.C.c. is a statute created by The National Conference of Commissioners on 
Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) and the American Law Institute (ALI) in an 
effort to simplify interstate transactions by providing for laws shared among the 
states. SELECTIONS FOR CONTRACTS: UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, 
RESTATEMENT SECOND, UN SALES CONVENTION, UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES, FORMS, 
1-2 (E. Allan Farnsworth & William F. Young eds., Foundation Press 2003). All 
states but Louisiana have adopted the V.C.C. such that it is the governing law 
where applicable. Id. at 2. The V.C.C. applies in various commercial and 
contractual matters. Id. at 2-3. 
26. See John W. Wade & Robert D. Kamenshine, Restitution for Defrauded 
Consumers: Making the Remedy Effective Through Suit by Governmental 
Agency, 37 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1031, 1038 (1969) (regarding warranties); 
U.C.C. § 2-313 cmt. 3 (2004). 
27. See infra note 32 and accompanying text. 
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Maryland's consumer law statutes, like those in most states, 
derive from the Federal Trade Conimission Act (FTCA).28 The 
federal courts have' held ,that the FTC has the expertise to 
determine whether a practice is unfair or deceptive without regard 
to the practice's actual impact on consumers. 29 "It is well 
established with regard to Section 13 of the FTC Act (which gives 
district courts the power to order equitable relief) that proof of 
individual reliance by each purchasing customer is not needed.,,3o 
The Maryland CPD also has the necessary expertise to determine 
whether advertisements can deceive or mislead the public. 31 
Therefore, consistent with federal practices under the FTCA, 
reliance is unnecessary for the Division to prove a violation. 32 
Not requiring reliance to fmd a violation33 helps further the 
legislative intent of the Act. 34 '''It would be inconsistent with the 
statutory purpose for the court to stifle effective prosecution of 
large consumer redress actions,'by requiring proof of subjective 
reliance by each individual consumer. ",35 Such proof would be 
repetitive and slow the process; requiring each consumer to bring 
an individual claim would compound the problem. 36 Actions in 
which the CPD may represent multiple consumers without proving 
reliance expedite the matter. 37 
2. Restitution in Consumer Protection Actions 
Restitution, which involves demanding something of the 
wrongdoer and delivering something to the victim,38 has become 
integral to consumer protection actions in various states. 
28. See Michael F. Brockmeyer, An Overview of State Consumer Protection Acts, 14 
A.L.L-A.B.A. COURSE STUDY J. 59-60, 64 (Aug. 1989); Seth William Goren, A 
Pothole on the Road to Recovery: Reliance and Private Class Actions Under 
Pennsylvania's Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law, 107 DICK. 
L. REv. 1, 13-14 (2002). 
29. See Consumer Publ'g, 304 Md. at 771, 501 A.2d at 69; see also Luskin's, 353 
Md. at 349, 726 A.2d at 709 (quoting FTC v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 317 F.2d 669, 
674 (2d Cir. 1963». 
30. FTC v. Figgie InCI, Inc., 994 F.2d 595, 605 (9th Cir. 1993). 
31. Consumer Publ'g, 304 Md. at 771, 501 A.2d at 69. 
32. See id. at 770-71, 501 A.2d at 68 (citing Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. FTC, 695 
F.2d 681, 687 (3d Cir. 1982»; Simeon Mgrnt. Corp. v. FTC, 579 F.2d 1137, 1146 
n.ll (9th Cir. 1978); Spiegel, Inc. v. FTC, 494 F.2d 59, 61-62 (7th Cir. 1974». 
33. See supra notes 25-30 and accompanying text. 
34. See infra notes 35-37 and accompanying text. 
35. David J. Federbush, Rebuttable Presumption of Reliance in Class Actions, 36 
MD. BAR J. 52, 54 (2003) (quoting 1983-2 Trade Cases. (CCH) 69,709 (N.D. Cal. 
1983». 
36. Goren, supra note 28, at 16 (citing Janicik v. Prudential Ins. Co., 451 A.2d 451, 
456 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982) (stating that "the number of potential individual 
plaintiffs would pose a grave imposition on the resources of the court and an 
unnecessary drain on the energies and resources of the litigants"». 
37. See Goren, supra note 28, at 15. 
38. See RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 1 cmt. a (1937). 
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Over the last thirty years, many states have adopted 
legislation permitting restitution in cases where the 
state attorney general or a state agency seeks to 
prohibit deception, deceptive acts and practices, or 
misrepresentation in connection with the sale or 
advertisement of any merchandise. Maryland's 
Consumer Protection Act is one such statute. These 
statutes empower the courts, and in some instances 
agencies, to issue orders requiring the restoration of 
money or other property acquired by any of the 
practices declared unlawful. 39 
397 
Black's Law Dictionary defines restitution as "[r]eturn or 
restoration of some specific thing to its rightful owner or status" or 
"[c]ompensation for loss.,,40 As a remedy for unjust enrichment, 
"the measure of recovery is usu[ally] based not on the plaintiffs 
loss, but on the defendant's gain.,,41 The remedy applies in 
contractual situations and instances of unfair or deceptive trade 
practices such as "insurance frauds, investment swindles, chain-
letter-like schemes, gifts or contributions, gaming and 
miscellaneous swindles,,,42 which the CPD works to prevent. 43 
With restitution, the courts can achieve the CPA's legislative 
intent to a greater extent than through civil penalties and 
injunctions alone.44 An injunction prevents future harm but does 
not remedy past wrongs, whereas restitution does. 
Businesses faced only with the possibility . of a 
prospective injunctive order would have little 
incentive to avoid commercial practices of dubious 
legality. Only a substantial likelihood that 
defendants who have engaged in unfair or deceptive 
trade practices will be subject to restitutionary 
orders will deter many with a mind to engage in 
sharp practices.45 
An offender might perceive civillenalties "as merely a hunting 
license for earning large profits.,,4 However, through restitution, 
39. Consumer Prot. Div. v. Consumer Publ'g Co., 304 Md. 731, 777, 501 A.2d 48, 
72 (1985) (citing Wade & Kamenshine, supra note 26, at 1059 n.184). 
40. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1339 (8th ed. 2004). A court may order 
compensation as part of a criminal sentence. Id. 
41. Id. 
42. Wade & Kamenshine, supra note 26, at 1046 (citing mUltiple case examples of 
where restitution was allowed as a remedy). 
43. See MD. CODE A1'/N., COM. LAW § 13-102(b)(3) (2005). 
44. See id. §§ 13-204(1), (11), 13-403(b)(I)(i~, 13-406; see also Consumer Prot. Div. 
v. Morgan, 387 Md. 125, 155,874 A.2d 919, 936-37 (2005). 
45. State ex rei. Kidwell y. Master Distributors, Inc.~ 615 P.2d 116, 124-25 (Idaho 
1980). 
46. Wade & Kamenshine, supra note 26, at 1051. 
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the court may take away all of the offender's profits and ensure 
that the offender does not benefit. 47 
3. The Special Case of Public Actions for Multiple Consumers 
Suits brought on behalf of multiple consumers differ from 
individual consumer actions in terms of the practicality of proof of 
reliance, both to establish a violation and to order restitution.48 An 
. individual who brings an action under consumer protection statutes 
is aware of why he or she is bringing the action and is available to 
address any Division or court concerns. The individual cannot 
access his or her remedies until he or she establishes the violation, 
but establishing the violation is inherent in bringing the action.49 
Reliance is a part of establishing the violation and, therefore, the 
court will have established reliance already when considering 
whether to issue a restitution order. 50 In contrast, if the Division 
represents multiple consumers, then proof of reliance involves the 
additional steps of identifying and contacting each consumer, and 
having each consumer indicate reliance as the individual consumer 
did. 51 To streamline the process, the Division need not prove 
reliance to order restitution in an action involving multiple 
consumers. 52 
B. The Dual Nature of Restitution 
Restitution is a two-part remedy, each part serving one aspect of 
the CPA's legislative intent. 53 In consumer protection actions, the 
first part is the disgorgement of the unlawfully gained profits from 
the offending business, which discourages future offenses. 54 '''The 
restitution claim ... is not aimed at compensating the plaintiff but 
at forcing the defendant to disgorge benefits it would be unjust for 
him to keep. ",55 In contract terms, restitution prevents "gain by 
47. ld. at 1034. 
48. Consumer Prot. Div. v. Consumer Publ'g Co., 304 Md. 731, 778-79, 501 A.2d 
48, 72-73 (1985). 
49. See MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 13-401. Individual attempts at recovery begin 
when the consumer files a complaint with the CPD; that complaint must state the 
"particulars of the violation." /d. § 13-401(a). Then, the CPD investigates the 
allegations, id. § 13-40 I (b), and, if appropriate, attempts conciliation, seeks an 
injunction, and/or holds a hearing. Id. §§ 13-402(a)(I )-(2), 13-403(a). 
50. "Traditionally, to be entitled to restitution because of misrepresentation [as which 
CPA violations under section 13-301 qualify], the plaintiff must prove reliance on 
a material misrepresentation." Consumer Pub/'g, 304 Md. at 777, 501 A.2d at 72 
(citing RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 9 (1937)). 
51. See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text. 
52. See infra Part II (C). 
53. See supra notes 11-12, 14 and accompanying text. 
54. Consumer Pub/'g, 304 Md. at 776, 501 A.2d at 71 (quoting DAN B. DOBBS, LAW 
OF REMEDIES § 4.1 (1973)). 
55. Id. (quoting DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 4.1 (1973)). 
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the defaulting promisor at the expense of the promisee.,,56 The 
Federal Trade Commission promoted restitution as a measure that 
should "drive the huckster out of the marketplace without 
interfering with the rights of the great majority of honest 
businessmen.,,57 
The second part of restitution is the return to the consumers of 
what the consumers lost through the unfair or deceptive trade 
practice; this part provides protection to the consumers. 58 Often, 
restitution offers consumers their best possibility of recovery. 59 
Restitution presents a more compelling case to the courts than 
other interests because restitution "involv[es] a combination of 
unjust impoverishment with unjust gain.,,6o This second part 
allows the Division to actualize the legislative intent by not only 
removing the profits from the violator but also returning them to 
the consumers. 
C. The Role of Reliance in Restitution 
In Maryland and other states, restitution applies without regard 
to the victim's reliance when the state's consumer protection 
division brings an action on behalf of multiple consumers,61 but 
courts still limit the Division's ability to order restitution. 62 The 
Maryland CPD may issue a general order of restitution without 
indicating how the Division will address consumer reliance, but the 
circumstances under which such an order is appropriate are very 
limited. 63 Some state courts require forethought by the state's 
consumer protection division on how money disgorged from the 
56. L.L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: 
Part I, 46 YALE L.J. 52, 54 (1936). 
57. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, REpORT ON THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CONSUMER 
PROTECTION PROGRAM 19-20 (1968). 
58. See Fuller & Perdue, supra note 56, at 53-54. Even in restoring consumers to 
their position before the unfair trade practices, "[t]he measure of recovery is the 
value of the benefit received by the defendant." Wade & Kamenshine, supra 
note 26, at 1034. Emphasis remains on disgorgement of the violator. See 
generally id. 
59. Wade & Kamenshine, supra note 26, at 1033. 
60. Fuller & Perdue, supra note 56, at 56. The result of restitution is that the other 
regains what he or she lost, but that result is secondary to the primary object of 
disgorging the offender. See id. at 52-54. 
61. See, e.g., Mo. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 13-302 (2005); Consumer Prot. Div. v. 
Morgan, 387 Md. 125, 162,874 A.2d 919, 940-41 (2005); Comm. on Children's 
Te1evision, Inc. v. Gen. Foods Corp., 673 P.2d 660, 668-69 (Cal. 1983) 
(restitution orders without proof of reliance are acceptable if necessary to prevent 
unfair practices); State ex reI. Kidwell v. Master Distributors, Inc., 615 P.2d 116, 
123 (Idaho 1980); Dix v. Am. Bankers Life Assurance Co., 415 N.W.2d 206, 209 
(Mich. 1987). 
62. See discussion infra Part II(D)(1) & (4). 
63. See Morgan, 387 Md. at 165-66, 874 A.2d at 943 (quoting Consumer Prot. Div. 
v. Consumer Publ'g Co., 304 Md. 731, 781, SOl A.2d 48,74 (1985» (general 
restitution order inappropriate if some consumers "may not want refunds"). 
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offending business shall reach the consumers. 64 The California 
Supreme Court only permits the attorney general to obtain 
restitution specifically for identified consumers. 65 That court 
previously had emphasized the importance of the disgorgement 
aspect of restitution: 
[T]he Legislature obviously intended to vest the 
trial court with broad authority to fashion a remedy 
that would effectively "prevent the use . .. of any 
practices which violate [the] chapter [proscribing 
unfair trade practices]" and deter the defendant, and 
similar entities, from engaging in such practices in 
the future. The requirement that a wrongdoing 
entity disgorge improperly obtained money surely 
serves as the prescribed strong deterrent. 66 
Yet the California Supreme Court later limited restitution by 
classifying the aforementioned language as a "comment" rather 
than a holding. 67 The Idaho Supreme Court requires a procedure 
"by which consumer claims may be efficiently and fairly 
processed.,,68 The procedure provided a means to effect "the 
greatest possible good for the greatest possible number of 
consumers who have common problems and complaints vis-a-vis 
the seller.,,69 The court did not address the possibility that where 
the group of consumers involved is discrete, mailing refunds might 
be more efficient than processing consumer claims. 70 Mailing 
refunds might indeed obviate the need for individual claims. 71 
The Maryland courts follow the Idaho precedent by requiring 
that before the CPD may award restitution to specific individuals, 
the CPD's restitution "order [must provide] a mechanism for 
processing individual claims."n Individuals must take affirmative 
action to state not only that they purchased the goods or product at 
issue but also that they relied on the violator's acts. 73 As a result, 
if the CPD does not present a procedure that requires consumer 
64. See, e.g., Consumer Publ'g, 304 Md. at 780-81, 501 A.2d at 73-74, and cases 
cited therein. 
65. See Kraus v. Trinity Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 999 P.2d 718,732 (Cal. 2000). 
66. Fletcher v. Sec. Pac. Nat'! Bank, 591 P.2d 51, 56 (Cal. 1979) (citation omitted). 
67. Kraus, 999 P.2d at 724. 
68. State ex reI. Kidwell v. Master Distributors, Inc., 615 P.2d 116, 126 (Idaho 1980). 
69. Id. (quoting Kugler v. Romain, 279 A.2d 640, 649 (N.J. 1971)). 
70. Mailing refunds would involve sending each identifiable customer his or her 
share in a stamped envelope. Processing claims might result in fewer shares to 
mail, yet it would involve company time dedicated to reading, sorting, verifying 
and recording each claim received. 
71. See discussion infra Part III(B). 
72. Consumer Prot. Div. v. Consumer Publ'g Co., 304 Md. 731, 775, 501 A.2d 48, 
71 (1985); see also Consumer Prot. Div. v. Morgan, 387 Md. 125, 166,874 A.2d 
919,943 (2005). 
73. See Morgan, 387 Md. at 166, 874 A.2d at 943. 
2007) Restitution in Consumer Protection Actions 401 
action toward obtaining reimbursements, the ill-gotten gains are 
not available to the consumers.74 Rather, even though restitution 
applies and the courts can prove a violation, the profits may remain 
in the hands of the offender. 75 
Two sides exist to restitution, 7~ but these requirements of 
reliance are relevant only to one side. On that side, the court 
should only award restitution to individuals who suffered loss due 
to the violation. 77 Therefore, the court might ask the CPD to have 
individuals prove their reliance if it is not evident. The other side 
of restitution considers only the profit the violation generated, 
without regard to the number of individuals harmed or the amount 
of harm caused to each. 78 Consumer indications of reliance have 
no bearing on this side. 79 Therefore, denying general orders 
because "some . . . consumers may not want refunds,,8o or 
requiring that the order include a plan for individuals to prove 
more than their purchase "might [result in] less effective 
implementation of the statute's goals. On balance, it is better for a 
court to keep the consumer's burden at a minimum, even though in 
rare cases some injustice to the defendant might result.,,81 The 
CPD should be able to use restitution to deny CPA violators their 
profits without having to address individual claims from the outset. 
D. Grants and Denials of Restitution in Maryland 
1. Consumer Protection Division v. Consumer Publishing CO. 82 
Maryland's requirements for restitution orders resulted from a 
case in which a company, Consumer Publishing, advertised and 
sold diet pills to Maryland consumers through newspaper 
advertisements. 83 The advertisements promoted the pills as 
appetite suppressants that increased the body's metabolic rate and 
thereby caused weight loss.84 Following an administrative hearing 
on complaints filed by the CPD, the Division issued a cease and 
desist order regarding Consumer Publishing's advertising 
practices. 85 The order further required restitution to all customers 
74. !d. 
75. See generally id. 
76. See discussion supra Part I1(B). 
77. See Fuller & Perdue, supra note 56, at 53-54. 
78. See id.; Consumer Prot. Div. v. Consumer Publ'g Co., 304 Md. 731, 770-71, 776, 
50 I A.2d 48, 68, 71 (1985). 
79. See Wade & Kamenshine, supra note 26, at 1061-62. 
80. Consumer Pub/'g, 304 Md. at 781, 501 A.2d at 74. 
81. Wade & Kamenshine, supra note 26, at 1061-62. 
82. 304 Md. 731,501 A.2d 48. 
83. ld. at 737,501 A.2d at 51. 
84. ld. at 739-40, 501 A.2d at 52-53. 
85. Id. 
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who purchased the pills during the period of advertising, and it 
indicated that Consumer Publishing's business records would 
identify the purchasers. 86 Consumer Publishing challenged the 
restitution order. 87 The Circuit Court vacated the Division's final 
order,88 and the Court of Appeals issued a writ of certiorari. 89 The 
Court of Appeals held "that the Division may enter a general order 
of restitution without proof of purchaser reliance, as long as the 
order provides a mechanism for processing individual claims.,,9o 
The appropriate procedure is: 
Purchasers should be notified that they may obtain a 
refund; in order to be entitled to such refund, they 
should be required to state that they relied on the 
false impressions created by the advertising ... , It 
should not be necessary that each purchaser present 
additional evidence that he was actually deceived 
and relied on the misrepresentations in the 
advertisements. 91 
This procedure prevents consumers who were not deceived from 
receiving restitution. 92 
The court further held that in Consumer Publishing, the order 
"did not provide a procedure for processing individual consumer 
claims.,,9 In coming to this holding, the court considered cases in 
other jurisdictions,94 such as the Idaho case discussed above. 95 
The court did not consider that, for the Idaho courts, the purpose of 
a procedure was efficiency and fairness. 96 Nor did the court 
consider that the plan to use the company's business records, and 
not to provide restitution to repeat customers, took efficiency and 
fairness into account. 97 Rather, the court held the procedure 
inadequate because "[s]ome of [the identified] consumers may not 
want refunds.,,98 The court did not explain under what 
circumstances someone would not want to receive a refund. 99 
86. Id. at 775-76, 50 I A.2d at 7I. 
87. Id. 
88. Id. at 740-41, 50 I A.2d at 53. 
89. Id. at 741, 501 A.2d at 53. 
90. Id. at 775, 501 A.2d at 71. 
91. Id. at 781, 501 A.2d at 74. An individual claim is "the consumer's statement that 
he/she relied on the targeted misrepresentations." Federbush, supra note 35, at 
52. 
92. Consumer Publ 'g, 304 Md. at 781, 50 I A.2d at 74. 
93. Id. at 775, 501 A.2d at 71. 
94. Id. at 779-80, 501 A.2d at 73. 
95. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text. 
96. See State ex rei. Kidwell v. Master Distributors, Inc., 615 P.2d 116, 126 (Idaho 
1980). See generally Consumer Publ 'g, 304 Md. 731, 50 I A.2d 48. 
97. See Consumer Publ'g, 304 Md. at 775-76, 501 A.2d at 71-72. 
98. Id. at 781, 50 I A.2d at 74. 
99. See Consumer Publ'g, 304 Md. 731, 501 A.2d 48. 
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2. Luskin's, Inc. v. Consumer Protection Division 100 
In Luskin's, Inc. v. Consumer Protection Division, the Court of 
Appeals considered the situation in which the group of affected 
customers was not clearly defined. 101 Through television and 
newspaper advertisements, Luskin's advertised that consumers 
who purchased a set amount of the retailer's electric and household 
goods and services would receive a free airline ticket. 102 
Following a series of communications and court actions regarding 
the advertisement and its revisions, which the CPD alleged 
violated the CPA, 103 the CPD issued a final order for monetary 
relief beyond restitution. l04 On appeal, the Court of Appeals held 
that "[t]he appropriate remedy under the circumstances of this case 
is to require Luskin's to disgorge the net profit it realized from the 
deceptive practice." lOS 
The court differentiated this case from Consumer Publishing 
because this case did not involve a discrete group of consumers. 106 
Consumer Publishing's customers all responded to an 
advertisement and, therefore, "reliance on the seller's advertising 
was inherent to a great degree in customer purchases.,,107 In 
contrast, some Luskin's customers might have purchased without 
seeing the advertisements and, consequently, the restitution 
procedure should exclude such customers. 108 
3. B&S Marketing Enterprises, LLC v. Consumer Protection 
Division 109 
Special circumstances arise when "there is no dispute that every 
person who entered such transaction paid money as a result of the 
'prohibited practice. '" II 0 In B &S Marketing Enterprises, LLC v. 
Consumer Protection Division, the defendants were businesses that 
offered a two-step process, advertised by television and radio, for 
consumers to obtain cash immediately. II I The defendants first 
"bought" 112 consumers' electronics for $100 cash per item and 
then leased the electronics back to their original owners at $30 per 
100. 353 Md. 335, 726 A.2d 702 (1999). 
IO\. See id. at 339,726 A.2d at 703-04. 
102. ld. 
103. ld. at 342-43, 726 A.2d at 705-06. 
104. ld. at 382-83, 726 A.2d at 725. 
105. !d. at 385, 726 A.2d at 726. 
106. ld. at 387, 726 A.2d at 727. 
107. ld. 
108. ld. 
109. 153 Md. App. 130,835 A.2d 215 (2003). 
110. !d. at 169 n.15, 835 A.2d at 238 n.15. 
III. ld. at 139-40, 835 A.2d at 220-21. 
112. The defendants did not acquire possession but merely recorded the electronics' 
serial numbers. ld. at 141, 835 A.2d at 221. 
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15-day perlod.1\3 The defendants did not explain to their 
customers that the lease could be terminated at any time by simply 
returning the electronics to the company; consumers thought that 
they had to repay their loans to repurchase their electronics. 114 The 
administrative law judge and the Division's Final Order required 
restitution. I 15 The. Circuit Court and Court of Special Appeals 
affirmed. 116 The Court of Special Appeals held that, because it 
was clear that all consumers' expenses resulted from violations of 
the CPA, "the Division did not have to show customer reliance to 
order restitution.,,\17 The court did not mention a procedure 
associated with restitution. I IS 
4 C P . D··· ~,r 119 . onsumer rotectzon lVlszon v. morgan 
In 2005, the Court of Appeals reaffirmed the need for a 
procedure to address individual claims and emphasized the 
unlikelihood of an appropriate general order of restitution. 12o 
Although the court had not had the opportunity to review B&S 
Marketing, less than two years later, the court had-and seized-
the opportunity to address these issues in Consumer Protection 
Division v. Morgan. 121 The case· invoh:ed a complex scheme 
through which a property-investor,. a mortgage len.der and two 
appraisers enticed "unsophisticated, first-time homebuyers" to 
purchase homes with only $1,000 down. 122 The defendants in the 
administrative hearing had advertised on television, through the 
mail, and in newspapers. 123 They falsified documents, altered 
prices without informing the buyers, and deceived customers at 
various points in the home buying process, among other unfair and 
deceptive trade practices. 124 As a result of their collaborative 
efforts, they sold 48 homes to customers who otherwise might not 
1l3. Id. at 139-41,835 A.2d at 220-21. 
114. Id. at 142-44, 835 A.2d at 222-23. 
liS. Id. at 146-48,835 A.2d at 225-26. 
Adopting what it called a "middle course," the Division only required 
appellants to pay as restitution to former customers the "net monetary 
gain" appellants received from violating the Consumer Protection Act 
. . .. Although that approach was less drastic than other alternatives, 
it had the desirable and lawful effect of preventing appellants from 
being unjustly enriched by their wrongful conduct. 
Id. ·at 169, 835· A.2d at 238. 
116. Id. at ISO, 171, 835 A.2d at 227, 239. 
117. Id. at 169,835 A.2d at 238. 
118. See generally B&S Mktg., 153 Md. App. 130,835 A.2d 215. 
119. 387 Md. 125,874 A.2d 919 (2005). 
120. Id. at 165-66,874 A.2d at 942-43. 
121. Id. 
. 122. Id. at 140, 150,874 A.2d at 927, 934. 
123. Id. at 150,874 A.2d at 933. 
124. Id. at ISO-54, 874 A.2d at 933-36. 
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have been able to purchase homes. 125 As a further result, many of 
the customers defaulted on their mortgages, which they could not 
actually afford. 126 One of the lenders had an early default claim 
rate "236% higher than the average rate of other comparable 
lenders in Baltimore." 127 
The CPD issued a cease and desist order, a restitution order, and 
assessed civil penalties,128 but the Court of Appeals vacated the 
restitution order as inadequate. 129 The Court of Appeals held that 
the CPD "can issue a general order of restitution without proving 
an individual consumer's reliance, but may not award restitution to 
the individual consumer without a showing of individual 
reliance." 130 By quoting its Consumer Publishing holding, the 
court renewed its belief that proof of individual reliance is 
necessary because "[s]ome . . . consumers may not want 
refunds." 131 The court held that such restitution orders 
(accompanied by procedures) could only be issued in situations 
involving "similarly situated individuals." 132 
In Morgan, the court increased the level of required proof of 
individual reliance for some circumstances by holding that 
statements of reliance were not enough; the consumers had to 
testify. 133 Thus, whether restitution necessitates consumer 
testimony must be decided on a case by case basis. 134 The CPD 
argued against additional testimony, 135 or other proof of reliance, 
on the premise that reliance was inherent. 136 The court rejected the 
125. !d. at 140,874 A.2d at 927-28. 
126. ld. at 152,874 A.2d at 934. 
127. ld. at 153,874 A.2d at 935. 
128. ld. at 155,874 A.2d at 936-37. 
129. ld. at 167,874 A.2d at 944. the CPD had the possibility of awarding restitution 
at a later date through a procedure involving testimony to prove individual 
reliance. /d. at 168,874 A.2d at 944. 
130. ld. at 166,874 A.2d at 943. 
131. !d. (quoting Consumer Prot. Div. v. Consumer Publ'g Co., 304 Md. 731,781, 
501 A.2d 48, 74 (1985». 
132. ld. at 165,874 A.2d at 943. 
133. ld. at 162,874 A.2d at 941. 
134. !d. ("Consumer testimony ... is not necessarily required to prove reliance for 
restitution. Whether consumer testimony is required to support a specific 
restitution order depends on the facts and circumstances of each case."). Contra 
Consumer Prot. Div. v. Consumer Publ'g Co., 304 Md. 731,770-71,776,501 
A.2d 48, 68-69 (1985) ("The Federal Trade Commission has consistently 
analyzed only the advertisements themselves, without requiring testimony by 
consumers . . . . [T]he Consumer Protection Division also has the expertise 
necessary to make that determination without testimony by consumers or 
consumer experts."). 
135. The administrative hearings. already involved testimony from seventeen 
consumers and others, over the course of eighteen days. Morgan, 387 Md. at 
149,874 A.2d at 933. 
136. ld. at 166-67,874 A.2d at 943. 
[T]he consumers could not have obtained the FHA-insured mortgages 
without the appraisers, sellers, and lenders' misrepresentations .... 
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CPD's argument "because some consumers could have been 
complicit or willing purchasers." 137 Some knew of the 
misrepresentations or might have accepted the inflated prices 
simply for the opportunity to purchase a home. 138 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. The Current Status of Restitution Orders at Maryland 
Common Law 
Following Morgan, consumers may find themselves without 
easy remedies and the CPD may find itself without effective 
measures to take against businesses that violate the CPA. 139 The 
CPD is the expert in these matters,140 and the expert consistently 
ordered restitution in the aforementioned cases. 14 Yet the courts 
held the restitution orders inadequate in two of the four cases. 142 
The courts should give the Division the deference the General 
Assembly intended it to receive. 143 
So that the consumer protection process may maintain its 
efficiency and effectiveness, Morgan must be held to its facts. 144 
Perhaps the Court of Appeals will reconsider the effects of its 
holding when it next considers a restitution order for a consumer 
protection action. In the meantime, the lower courts have little 
recourse to avoid the required procedure entailing consumer action 
prior to receipt of restitution, but they can limit it as much as 
Similarly, the purchasers would not have been able to obtain the 
mortgages necessary for the property sale had [defendant] Shpritz not 
made illegal payments to the consumers and misrepresented the 
consumers' financial situation and had [defendants] American 
Skycorp and Woody not approved the mortgages. 
[d. 
137. [d. at 167,874 A.2d at 943. 
138. [d. at 167,874 A.2d at 943-44. 
139. See infra notes 147-150 and accompanying text. 
140. See Morgan, 387 Md. at 149, 874 A.2d at 933; Consumer Prot. Div. v. Consumer 
Publ'g Co., 304 Md. 731, 747, 771,501 A.2d 48, 56-57, 69 (1985) (CPO has 
expertise to determine deceptiveness of advertisements; CPO determines 
appropriate remedy for CPA violations; the courts should not perform CPO's' 
role). 
141. See Morgan, 387 Md. at 155, 874 A.2d at 936-37; Luskin's, Inc. v. Consumer 
Prot. Div., 353 Md. 335, 382-83, 726 A.2d 702, 725 (1999); Consumer Pub/'g, 
304 Md. at 775-76, 501 A.2d at 71; B&S Mktg. Enters., LLC v. Consumer Prot. 
Div., 153 Md. App. 130, 148,835 A.2d 215, 226 (2003). 
142. See Morgan, 387 Md. at 167, 874 A.2d at 944 (order inadequate); Luskin's, 353 
Md. at 385,726 A.2d at 726; Consumer Pub/'g, 304 Md. at 775-76, 501 A.2d at 
71 (order inadequate); B&S Mktg., 153 Md. App. at 170-71,835 A.2d at 239. 
143. See supra note 140. 
144. See infra notes 147-150 and accompanying text. 
2007) Restitution in Consumer Protection Actions 407 
possible.1 45 Morgan presented a rare scenario in which consumers 
might have knowingly violated statutory law through their 
interactions with the defendants. 146 In most consumer protection 
actions, consumer violations should not be a factor. Therefore, 
consumer testimony typically should not be necessary and 
consumer proof of reliance should be no more than a statement to 
that effect. 
The courts should limit requirements for individual consumer 
statements, thereby lowering the bar for general restitution orders, 
so that the procedure for restitution furthers the legislative intent 
rather than thwarting it. If the CPD issues restitution orders in 
compliance with the Morgan holding, the violator will not have to 
provide any restitution to individual consumers until and unless the 
consumers take action to demonstrate reliance. 147 Even though 
that consumer action may be nothing more than writing a letter, it 
may be enough to deter some consumers from pursuing the 
remedy.148 In cases of minimal harm to individual consumers, the 
consumers may not find the action worth their while. 149 In cases 
of more significant harm, consumers may not hear of the remedy 
or may not understand their role. 150 The General Assembly 
designed the CPA to protect all levels of consumers. 151 To protect 
educated and uneducated, motivated and unmotivated, gullible and 
skeptical consumers, the courts should not create hurdles when the 
consumers have already suffered loss. Making it harder for 
consumers to access restitution increases the likelihood that the 
money remains with the violator and the consumers do not receive 
refunds. 152 Such results are contrary to the General Assembly's 
intent. 153 
The Maryland courts should consider the purpose behind the 
introduction of procedures for restitution orders and uphold the law 
accordingly. The Consumer Publishing holding was issued over 
145. AMY E. SLOAN, BASIC LEGAL RESEARCH: TOOLS AND STRATEGIES 5 (Aspen 
Publishers 2d ed. 2003) ("[L]ower courts are required to follow decisions from 
higher courts in the same jurisdiction."). 
146. Morgan, 387 Md. at 167,874 A.2d at 943-44. 
147. See id. at 163-64, 874 A.2d at 941-42. 
148. Consumer Prot. Div. v. Consumer Publ'g Co., 304 Md. 731, 758, 501 A.2d 48, 
62 (1985). 
149. [d. at 758, 501 A.2d at 62; see Fletcher v. Sec. Pac. Nat'l Bank, 591 P.2d 51, 54 
(Cal. 1979). 
150. See Fletcher, 591 P.2d at 54 (the "lack of awareness of legal rights on the part of 
most borrowers" contributes to the impracticality of individual actions). 
151. See McGraw v. Loyola Ford, Inc., 124 Md. App. 560, 579, 723 A.2d 502, 511 
(1999) (construing MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 13-301 to protect "ordinary 
consumers" as a broader group than those protected under the FTCA). 
152. See Consumer Prot. Div. v. Morgan, 387 Md. 125, 165-66,874 A.2d 919, 942-43 
(no general order when individuals not similarly situated; no specific order 
without consumer statement). 
153. See MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 13-102(b)(3) (2005). 
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twenty years ago as a restatement of common law in other 
jurisdictions, such as Idaho. 154 Idaho's purpose in consumer 
protection law, like Maryland's, involved efficiency and 
faimess. 155 To that end, Maryland courts should not add extra 
steps to the restitution process when they are not necessary, nor 
should Maryland courts allow violators to keep their ill-gotten 
gains. 156 Individual consumer claims contradict the purpose of 
allowing the CPD to bring a suit on behalf of multiple consumers 
by reintroducing multiple claims for the same wrong. 157 Where a 
discrete group of consumers suffered loss due to a violation such 
that their reliance is inherent in the transaction and the offender's 
profit is determinable, the CPD should be able to deliver restitution 
without the step of receiving individual claims from consumers. 158 
Consumer interest should not be a factor when the case does not 
involve restoration, but the Maryland Court of Appeals set the 
precedent that general orders are inappropriate when some 
consumers might not want restitution. 159 The Louisiana courts 
also consider the consumer's interest in restitution: "Whether or 
not a consumer is entitled to restitution is dependent upon proof 
whether he was, in fact, aggrieved, the extent to which he was 
aggrieved or, indeed, whether he desires restitution . ... ,,\60 Under 
traditional rules for restitution, where restoration-returning the 
product to the deceitful seller-accompanies restitution, a 
consumer might not want a refund because the consumer might not 
want to return the product. 161 However, under the CPA, 
restoration is not always a part of restitution. 162 None of the 
aforementioned cases involved restoration. 163 Thus, it is only a 
question of whether individual consumers want to receive 
money.l64 Some might appreciate the product they receive, despite 
154. Consumer Prot. Div. v. Consumer Publ'g Co., 304 Md. 731, 780-81, 501 A.2d 
48,72-74 (1985). 
155. See supra note 154 and accompanying text. See generally State v. Andrews, 73 
Md. App. 80, 85, 533 A.2d 282, 285 (1987) (purpose of public action is to reduce 
time involved in litigation and make recovery accessible to more consumers). 
156. See generally supra note 154 and accompanying text. 
157. See Andrews, 73 Md. App. at 85,533 A.2d at 285. 
158. See B&S Mktg. Enters., LLC v. Consumer Prot. Div., 153 Md. App. 130, 169 
n.15, 835 A.2d 215,238 n.15 (2003). 
159. See Consumer Publ'g, 304 Md. at 781, 501 A.2d at 74, quoted in Consumer Prot. 
Div. v. Morgan, 387 Md. 125, 166,874 A.2d 919, 943 (2005). 
160. State ex rei. Guste v. Gen. Motors Corp., 354 So. 2d 770, 776 (La. Ct. App. 1978) 
(emphasis added). 
161. See Wade & Kamenshine, supra note 26, at \041. 
162. See Luskin's, Inc. v. Consumer Prot. Div., 353 Md. 335, 386, 726 A.2d 702, 727 
(1999) (no restoration when impractical). 
163. See generally Morgan, 387 Md. 125,874 A.2d 919; Luskin's, 353 Md. 335, 726 
A.2d 702; Consumer Publ'g, 304 Md. 731, 501 A.2d 48; B&S Mktg., 153 Md. 
App. 130, 835 A.2d 215. 
164. See generally supra note 163 and accompanying text. 
20071 Restitution in Consumer Protection Actions 409 
the evidence of misrepresentation or fraud, but that is not a reason 
to deprive them of a refund. To the contrary, a consumer's 
continued belief in a product or service that either is ineffective or 
detrimental to the consumer indicates the need for acts such as the 
CPA that protect such consumers. 165 Whether the consumer 
believes in the product is irrelevant; the facts prove that the 
consumer deserves a refund. 166 Furthermore, it is hard to conceive 
of the circumstances in which a consumer, content or not with his 
or her purchase, would object to a refund. 
B. Legislative Reform 
In the interest of efficiency, effectiveness, and eliminating the 
roadblock placed by Morgan, the General Assembly should 
consider additional provisions for the CPA. Actions that the CPD 
bring could be divided into two categories: those involving discrete 
consumer groups where reliance is evident without proof, and 
those involving a less-defined set of victims. 167 Each category 
needs a different form of legislative protection. 
1. Restitution without Consumer Action 
The first provision should allow restitution without consumer 
action for discrete consumer groups where reliance is evident 
without proof. 168 The question of whether consumers want a 
refund should not be considered. 169 Consumers who did not want 
the refund could mail it back. 170 Consequently, the statute would 
supersede Morgan, except as it applies to situations where 
165. See CHARLES B. SHAFER, MARYLAND CONSUMER LAW: SALES, LEASES AND 
FINANCING 130-31 (MICPEL 2006) (complicit purchasers in Morgan should not 
be penalized for falling for a scheme they did not initiate). 
166. Consider Consumer Publishing: The CPD and the court required disclosure that 
the pills did not do most, if not all, of what they claimed to do and would not 
work at all without dieting. 304 Md. at 739-40, 501 A.2d at 52-53. Yet 
consumers who reordered did not receive refunds because reordering indicated 
satisfaction with what might be little more than a placebo and coincidental weight 
loss. See id. at 775-76, 50 I A.2d at 71. GulIible consumers should not be 
punished for their credulousness. See SHAFER, supra note 165, at 131. 
167. The victims might be less defined either because they are unknown or because 
not all should receive refunds, such as was the case in Morgan. See Morgan, 387 
Md. at 167, 874 A.2d at 943-44. 
168. See discussion supra Part III(A). 
169. See discussion supra Part I1I(A). 
170. Consumers could also decide to spend their refunds on other consumer products, 
as a good number would probably choose to do. Thus, it is not only the 
consumers who would benefit from this reform but also other businesses. Those 
businesses that did not violate the Act and therefore could receive customer 
orders would be the ultimate re~ipients of a percentage ·of the disgorged funds. In 
effect, they would be rewarded for their compliance and consumers would benefit 
from the redirection to honest businesses and the perhaps more reliable products 
the honest businesses sold. 
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consumers might have been involved in the scheme. 171 The statute 
would eliminate the required procedure for processing individual 
claims to the extent that it required consumers to write in, stating 
their reliance and requesting their restitution. 172 This provision 
would further the le¥islative intent of protecting the customers and 
doing so efficiently. 73 
The General Assembly could amend the Commercial Law 
Article of the Annotated Code of Maryland, section 13-403, with 
the addition of the following italicized words to subsection (b)(I): 
(b)( 1 )(i) If, at the conclusion of the hearing, the 
Division determines on the preponderance of 
evidence that the alleged violator violated this title, 
the Division shall state its findings and issue an 
order requiring the violator to cease and desist from 
the violation and to take affirmative action, 
including the restitution of money or property 
(iv) Restitution shall be made without consumer 
action when reliance is evident from the 
transaction. Consumer interest in restitution shall 
not be a factor unless restitution involves 
restoration of money or property to the alleged 
violator. 
Section 13-402, regarding conciliation procedures, could 
include the same language in subsection (b)(I), as suggested in 
italics: 
(b)( 1) A written assurance of discontinuance or a 
settlement agreement may include a stipulation or 
condition for the violator or alleged violator to: 
(ii) Make restitution to the consumer of money, 
property, or any other thing received from the 
consumer in connection with a violation or alleged 
violation of this title. Restitution shall be made 
without consumer action when reliance is evident 
from the transaction. Consumer interest in 
restitution shall not be a factor unless restitution 
171. See supra notes 135-138. However, the courts should assess consumer 
involvement to see whether their involvement should disqualifY them. See supra 
note 165. 
172. See supra note 91 and accompanying text. 
173. See MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 13-102(b)(3) (2005); see supra notes 155-157 
and accompanying text. 
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involves restoration of money or property to the 
alleged violator. 
411 
With such language in place, consumers would more frequently 
receive their refunds and violators would not be able to retain their 
profits simply due to lack of consumer action. 174 The process 
would be quicker and cheaper without the steps involved in 
individual claims. 175 Yet, when appropriate, the courts could 
follow their current protocol. 176 The overall result would be a 
more effective implementation of the CPA. 
2. Fluid Recovery 
The second provision should allow fluid recovery as a remedy 
when restitution is inappropriate without consumer action. Fluid 
recovery, also called cy pres distribution,177 "is a means of putting 
unclaimed class funds to their 'next best use,' [which] usually 
takes the form of a consumer trust fund or an across-the-board 
price reduction for a defendant's product until the ill-gotten gains 
are disgorged.,,178 It would help fully accomplish the purpose of 
the Act 179 by disgorging the offending businesses, even when the 
courts cannot identify or locate the wronged consumers or the 
consumers cannot (or simply do not) prove reliance. 180 Fluid 
recovery would also be useful in cases involving "individual 
damages ... so small that notification and distribution costs exceed 
the recoverable amount or reduce it to a pittance.,,181 The remedy 
should only apply when disgorgement is appropriate yet the courts 
cannot distribute the funds to the consumers,182 either for the 
174. See discussion supra Part III(A). 
175. See discussion supra Part IIJ(A). 
176. See supra notes 91, 135-138, 172 and accompanying text. 
177. See Cicelski v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 348 N.W.2d 685,689 (Mich. App. 1984); 
see also Madrid v. Perot Sys. Corp., 30 Cal. Rptr. 3d 210, 225 n.8 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2005) (,"Fluid recovery' refers to the application of the equitable doctrine of 
cypres (putting charitable trust funds to the next best use if the trust purpose can 
no longer be accomplished) in the context of a modem class action.") (citing 
Kraus v. Trinity Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 999 P.2d 718 (Cal. 2000)). 
178. Stan Karas, Note, The Role of Fluid Recovery in Consumer Protection Litigation: 
Kraus v. Trinity Management Services, 90 CAL. L. REV. 959, 961-62 (2002) 
(citing Natalie A. DeJarlais, Note, The Consumer Trust Fund: A Cy Pres Solution 
to Undistributed Funds in Consumer Class Actions, 38 HASTINGS LJ. 729, 730, 
753-55, 759-65 (1987)). 
179. See MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 13-102(b)(3) (2005). 
180. See Simer v. Rios, 661 F.2d 655,675 (7th Cir. 1981). 
181. DeJariais, supra note 178, at 730 (citing State v. Levi Strauss & Co., 715 P.2d 
564, 565 (1986) ("35 to 40 cent recovery per pair of jeans, with an average 
individual recovery of $2.60-$3.00")); Cartt v. Superior Court, 124 Cal. Rptr. 
376, 385 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975) (stating that damages to individual consumers 
misled by defendant's advertising were "trifling"). 
182. Madrid, 30 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 225 n.8 (quoting Kraus, 999 P.2d at 725). 
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aforementioned reasons or because the consumers conspired with 
the business in violating the Act. 183 
Fluid recovery in consumer protection actions is a logical 
progression from the current practices in Maryland and other 
states. 184 In Morgan, the court noted that the Division's Final 
Order mentioned that '''it is possible that a person other than the 
consumer, such as the FHA, might be the appropriate recipient of 
some of the restitution. '" 185 The coUrt's reference to this language 
shows that the Division considers-and the court approves of-
restitution as a means of prohibiting the violator from profiting, 
even when the profit is not restored to the consumers.186 The Act 
already provides for the Division to "[a]ssist, develop, and conduct 
programs of consumer education and information through 
publications and other materials prepared for distribution to 
consumers," 187 an area that could benefit from fluid recovery fund 
money. 188 In Illinois, the A.ppellate Court concluded that fluid 
recovery was appropriate for an action brought under Illinois's 
Consumer Fraud Act: 
Plaintiffs allege, inter alia, that defendants violated 
the Consumer Fraud Act. "The Act is a regulatory 
and remedial enactment intended to curb a variety 
of fraudulent abuses and to provide a remedy to 
individuals injured by them." Section Iia of the 
Act provides that "[the] Act be liberally construed 
to effect the purposes thereof." It is quite 
established that "[t]he provision is a clear mandate 
from the Illinois legislature that our courts utilize 
the Act to the utmost degree in eradicating all forms 
of deceptive and unfair business practices and grant 
appropriate' remedies to injured parties." This 
legislative intent and mandate necessarily include 
policies of deterrence, disgorgement, and 
compensation. Thus, we hold that fluid recovery is 
available in at least the claim brought under the 
Consumer Fraud Act. 189 
The Maryland courts similarly construed the CPA to grant the 
Division "broad authority to construct the roadblock necessary to 
183. See, e.g., Consumer Prot. Div. v. Morgan, 387 Md. 125,874 A.2d 919 (2005). 
184. See infra notes 185-92 and accompanying text. 
185. Morgan, 387 Md. at 168 n.24, 874 A.2d at 944 n.24. 
186. See generally id. 
187. MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 13-204(8). (2005). 
188. See infra notes 189-190 and accompanying text. 
189. Gordon v. Boden, 586 N.E.2d 461, 468 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (citations omitted). 
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'close all roads to the prohibited goal,' [albeit] within the confines 
of the statutory authorization." 190 
Furthermore, other states and the federal courts recognize and 
employ fluid recovery in class actions. 191 Fluid recovery is 
being used or advocated increasingly where direct 
distribution of settlement funds to individual class 
members is impractical; and where important 
consumer goals, such as disgorgement of ill-gotten 
gains from and deterrence of future over-pricing 
and manipulation of market allocation by the 
offending entities, can be achieved. 192 
Such situations present themselves in the first part of restitution as 
a remedy in CPD-initiated actions in Maryland. 193 A California 
Law Review article noted the similarity between class actions and 
actions brought under consumer protection laws, suggestinft the applicability of fluid recovery to consumer protection actions. 94 
Fluid recovery is appropriate as a remedy when the CPD brings 
a suit, and the Maryland legislature should codify it as a part of the 
CPA. 195 Courts have noted that fluid recovery should not apply in 
all circumstances, but rather when its application "is consistent 
with the policy or policies reflected by the statute violated.,,196 
Courts should consider "to what extent the statute embodies 
policies of deterrence, disgorgement, and compensation." 197 The 
190. Consumer Prot. Div. v. George, 383 Md. 505, 521, 860 A.2d 896, 905 (2004). 
191. See, e.g., Simer v. Rios, 661 F.2d 655, 675 (7th Cir. 1981); Madrid v. Perot Sys. 
Corp., 30 Cal. Rptr. 3d 210, 225 n.8 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005); Boyle v. Giral, 820 
A.2d 561, 569-70 (D.C. 2003); Miles v. Philip Morris Cos., No. 00L0112, 2001 
WL 34366710, at *2 (Ill. Cir. Feb. I, 2001); Cicelski v. Sears, Roebuck & 
Co., 348 N.W.2d 685, 691-92 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984); Buchholz Mortuaries, Inc. 
v. Dir. of Revenue, 113 S.W.3d 192, 195-96 n.l (Mo. 2003) (en banc) (Wolff, J., 
concurring); Muise v. GPU, Inc., 851 A.2d 799, 823 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
2004); Ritter, Laber & Assocs., Inc. v. Koch Oil, Inc., 623 N.W.2d 424, 
429 (N.D. 2001) (citing N.D. R. Civ. P. 23(0)); see also Dallas County Cmty. 
Coli. Dist. v. Bolton, 89 S.W.3d 707, 722 (Tex. App. 2002) (fluid recovery not 
held unlawful by Texas courts). 
192. Boyle, 820 A.2d at 569-70 (citing New York v. Reebok Int'l Ltd., 96 F.3d 44 (2d 
Cir. 1996); In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 179 (2d Cir. 1987); 
New York v. Keds Corp., No. 93 CIY 6798,1994 WL 97201 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 21, 
1994) (footnote and citation omitted). 
193. See discussion supra Part I1(B). 
194. Karas, supra note 178, at 962 ("Although representative actions under the UCL 
[which is California's consumer protection statute] are not class actions, they 
provide plaintiffs with many of the benefits of class actions without imposing 
some of the burdensome legal requirements of that device, such as those related 
to standing, notice, and class certification."). 
195. The scope of this Comment does not reach the question of whether fluid recovery 
should apply to class actions. 
196. Simer, 661 F.2d at 676 (quoted in Cice/ski,.348 N.W.2d at 690-91) (footnotes 
omitted). . 
197. Id. (quoted in Cicelski, 348 N.W.2d at 691) (footnotes omitted) .. 
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objectives of Maryland's CPA are to discourage future violations 
and to protect consumers, and restitution already exists as a 
statutory remedy elsewhere in the Maryland Commercial Code. 198 
Therefore, fluid recovery is an appropriate remedy under the 
Maryland CPA. 
With fluid recovery, the required proof of reliance would still 
stand between consumers and the recovery of any losses, but the 
proof would not hinder disgorgement of the offending 
businesses. 199 Fluid recovery provides a procedure for handling 
proof of damages through an administrative claims process rather 
than prolonged litigation. 200 First, the court orders the 
disgorgement of the violator and establishes a fund for the 
money.201 Second, wronged consumers make individual claims 
and receive refunds upon proof of reliance,202 as provided for in 
Morgan. 203 Alternatively, the violator might first provide 
restitution to all consumers who submit claims and then the 
violator would remit the remainder of his or her profits to create 
the fund. 204 Third, "[t]he remainder of the fund is: (1) distributed 
through the market, usually in the form of reduced charges, or (2) 
used to fund a project which will likely benefit class members.,,205 
Examples of uses include "nonprofit organizations or foundations 
to support projects that will benefit the class or similarly situated 
persons, or that promote the law consistent with the objectives of 
the underlying lawsuit.,,206 
Codifying fluid recovery under the CPA would provide an 
appropriate use for the money obtained from disgorging the 
offending business. 207 As explained in a California Court of 
Appeals decision: 
198. See MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW §§ 13-102(b)(3), 13-402(b)(I)(ii), 13-
403(b)(I)(i), 13-406 (2005). 
199. Cj supra note 152 and accompanying text. 
200. See Miles v. Philip Morris Cos., No. 00L0112, 2001 WL 34366710, at *2 (Ill. 
Cir. Feb. 1,2001). 
201. See Cicelski, 348 N.W.2d at 689. The federal legislature has codified federal 
trust funds for similar circumstances involving individuals whom the court cannot 
locate. See Wade & Kamenshine, supra note 26, at 1056 (quoting 31 U.S.c. § 
725p (1964) and citing 28 U.S.c. § 2042 (2001)). "Thus, 'the United States has 
no beneficial interest ... but holds the money as a statutory trustee for the 
rightful owners when and if they are determined by the court.''' Id. (quoting In 
re Moneys Deposited Etc., 243 F.2d 443 (3d Cir. 1957)). 
202. See Cicelski, 348 N.W.2d at 689. 
203. See supra note 130 and accompanying text. 
204. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 384 (West 2004). In either version, the consumers 
should submit claims by a court-proclaimed deadline so that it is clear what 
money remains for distribution in Step 3. 
205. Gordon v. Boden, 586 N.E.2d 461,467 (III. App. Ct. 1991). 
206. Madrid v. Perot Sys. Corp., 30 Cal. Rptr. 3d 210, 225 n.8 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005). 
207. See infra notes 208-210 and accompanying text. 
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The theory underlying fluid class recovery is that 
since each class member cannot be compensated 
exactly for the damage he or she suffered, the best 
alternative is to pay damages in a way that benefits 
as many of the class members as possible and in the 
approximate proportion that each member has been 
damaged, even though some class members may not 
receive compensation and some non-class-members 
will benefit from the distribution. 208 
415 
That way, the second part of restitution, involving refunds, would 
not present a roadblock to the first part, involving disgorgement. 209 
The court could provide "the next best use,,210 of the money after a 
direct refund to individual consumers, and the violator would not 
be able to retain the ill-gotten goods. 211 
The General Assembly could amend the Commercial Law 
Article of the Annotated Code of Maryland, section 13-406, to 
include another available remedy, and the General Assembly could 
add a section codifying fluid recovery under the CPA. For section 
13-406, the General Assembly could augment subsection (c) as 
follows in italics: 
(c) The court may enter any order of judgment 
necessary to: 
(4) Disgorge from a person any money or real or 
personal property acquired by him by means of any 
prohibited practice. 
The General Assembly could then codify fluid recovery as 
follows: 
Collection and Distribution of Restitution in 
Actions Brought by the Consumer Protection 
Division212 
(a) This section applies only to actions brought by 
the Consumer Protection Division. 
(b) Prior to the entry of any restitution order, the 
court shall determine the total amount that the party 
found in violation of the Act must surrender. The 
court shall also set a date when the parties shall 
208. Madrid, 30 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 225 n.8 (citing Kraus v. Trinity Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 
999 P.2d 718, 726 (Cal. 2000». 
209. See discussion supra Part 11(8). 
210. See Kraus, 999 P.2d at 726. 
211. See supra notes 20 I, 204. 
212. Language adapted in part from CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 384 (West 2004). 
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report to the court the total amount that the 
defendant actually paid to the affected consumers as 
per the restitution order. After receiving the report, 
the court213 shall amend the judgment to direct the 
defendant to pay the remainder of the restitution, 
plus interest on that sum at the legal rate of interest 
from the date of entry of the initial judgment, 
according to a distribution schedule that the court 
shall provide with the amended judgment, to a 
combination of one or more of the following 
entities: 
(i) nonprofit organizations or foundations to support 
projects that will benefit the consumers or similarly 
situated persons, 
(ii) nonprofit organizations or foundations that 
promote the law consistent with the objectives and 
purposes of the underlying cause of action, 
(iii) child advocacy programs, or 
(iv) nonprofit organizations providing civil legal 
services to the indigent. 
The court shall ensure that the distribution of any 
unpaid residual derived from cases brought under 
Maryland law, against out-of-state defendants, shall 
provide substantial or commensurate benefit to 
Maryland consumers. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
[Vol. 36 
Restitution orders should help defrauded consumers and "deter 
unscrupulous businessmen from pursuing new schemes.,,214 
Holding Morgan to its facts will allow restitution to reach more 
consumers; overturning Morgan on this issue would do so more 
effectively.215 Legislative reform also can help the CPD realize 
the purpose of the Act. 216 Eliminating the need for individual 
proof of reliance where reliance is inherent in the violation and the 
consumers form a discrete group will provide better consumer 
213. This proposed language does not provide for the other means of fluid recovery 
(mandatory reduction of the defendant's prices) because such reduction might 
attract new customers to the defendant, thereby indirectly benefitting the 
defendant. But see Delarlais, supra note 178, at 753 ("This solution is useful 
because the benefits of lower prices are bestowed on a similar, although 'fluid' 
class of plaintiffs. "). 
214. Wade & Kamenshine, supra note 26, at 1050. 
215. See discussion supra Part III(A). 
216. See discussion supra Part III(B). 
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protection and enhanced efficiency. 217 Adding fluid recovery will 
further discourage businesses from future violations by making it 
unlikely that a business could retain its wrongful gains. 218 As a 
result, the CPA will work more effectively.219 
Lisa Yurwit 
217. See discussion supra Part III(8)( I). 
218. See discussion supra Part III(8)(2). 
219. See discussion supra Part III. 
